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THE STATE OF UTAH, 
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v. 
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Case No. 960259-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The fourth amendment to the federal constitution 
provides: 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden -- Issuance 
of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. MR ALIRES' CLAIMS ARE PRESERVED, HAVE NOT 
BEEN ADDRESSED BY THE STATE ON THE MERITS, ARE 
MERITORIOUS, AND MANDATE REVERSAL. 
A. MR. ALIRES' MOTION TO SUPPRESS, COUPLED 
WITH HIS CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA, 
ADEQUATELY PRESERVE ALL OF HIS FOURTH 
AMENDMENT CLAIMS. 
Pursuant to Rule 11(i), Mr. Alires pled conditionally 
guilty, preserving 'the denial of his motion to suppress evidence 
seized from the vehicle he was operating. R. 178-85. Mr. Alires 
argued that the seizure was unconstitutional, and has appealed the 
trial court's ruling to the contrary. No waiver has occurred. All 
issues are preserved. 
B. THE STATE'S WAIVER ARGUMENT IS FACTUALLY 
UNSUPPORTED. 
The State responds to Mr. Alires' scope of detention 
argument with the unsupported claim that the argument he is making 
is in fact a probable cause to arrest claim which was not made 
below and is thus waived. The State cites no authority for the 
proposition that it may redesignate an appellant's claims for its 
own convenience in responding on the merits. The State seeks to 
erect its own strawman and knock it down, rather than respond on 
the merits. 
Mr. Alires' opening brief was not written in code; each 
of the "purported"1 claims he makes are bona fide. They say what 
they say. Issue I is a claim that Trooper Rapich exceeded the 
scope of the traffic stop when he began questioning about weapons 
and contraband without a reasonable suspicion. 
Scope of detention was specifically raised below during 
the suppression hearing: 
1See State's brief at the heading of Point I ("DEFENDANT'S 
PURPORTED CHALLENGE TO THE SCOPE OF HIS DETENTION . . . " ) . 
2 
He's detained for a period of five minutes. 
There are no citations that are written at that point, 
there's no confirmation from dispatch, there's nothing 
done to initiate the ticket writing-process. And after 
a five-minute period of time, your inquiry into a 
completely different area involving weapons, and maybe 
illegal items that may have been placed in the vehicle. 
Would Mr. Alires have been free to leave after 
he'd been written a ticket? He may very well have been. 
There are circumstances, I suspect, where he may have 
been written a ticket during that five-minute period of 
time, and then be allowed to leave. 
What would have happened to the vehicle, I 
suppose, is speculation. But the point is, at the point 
that they begin asking him permission to search, a five-
minute period of time, and nothing has been done to 
initiate or complete the stop. 
And we would suggest at that period of time 
that they have exceeded the scope of their authority by 
not doing that . . . 
R. 241 (emphasis added) . See also R. 23 8 ("Number two, was 
voluntary consent given at a time when the police had a right to 
detain Mr. Alires?11) . 
This case is before this court pursuant to a conditional 
guilty plea, whereby the State, as a party to the agreement, 
stipulated, promised, and agreed that Mr. Alires could raise the 
denial of his motion to suppress in an appeal to this Court. See 
R. 178-85 (statement of defendant, certificate of counsel and 
order). Implicit in this agreement is that all matters argued with 
respect to the preserved motion are preserved, and the State will 
address the issues on the merits. An appellant's offer to plead 
conditionally guilty 
cannot be enforced until the condition he relied on is 
satisfied. For this reason, the court of appeals' 
decision to enforce a conviction reached on the basis of 
Rivera's conditional plea while refusing to review [his 
preserved issue] is unfair and therefore contrary to the 
public policy . . . 
3 
State v. Rivera, 323 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 23 (Utah 1997) . The State 
cannot stipulate and agree to review at the trial court level, and 
then claim waiver in this Court.2 Mr. Alires' claims must be 
addressed on the merits. 
Mr. Alires' first claim is not a probable cause to arrest 
claim; it is a scope of detention claim. Although couched in the 
terminology of waiver, what the State is attempting to do is both 
respond to Mr. Alires scope of detention claim on the merits by 
asserting that the officer had probable cause to arrest prior to 
the search, and simultaneously preclude Mr. Alires from responding 
to this contention by claiming waiver. Waiver jurisprudence does 
not require an appellant to anticipate every argument the State 
might make in its brief and respond to those arguments in the trial 
court. Instead, the rules expressly allow an appellant to file a 
reply brief. Mr. Alires has not waived his opportunity to file a 
reply brief responding to the State's arguments, and does so here. 
C. ON THE MERITS, MR. ALIRES' SCOPE OF 
DETENTION CLAIM WARRANTS REVERSAL. 
The State's merits argument on the scope of detention 
issue consists of a single sentence: "Indeed, there is no scope of 
detention issue in this case." State's brief at 12. On the 
contrary, as set forth in Mr. Alires' opening brief at Point I, pp. 
7-13, Trooper Rapich's questioning concerning weapons and 
2Arguably, the State's waiver argument here is a breach of the 
plea agreement. However, Mr. Alires does not seek recision of his 
plea agreement. He wants the merits review before this Court that 
was promised by both the prosecutor and the trial court. 
4 
contraband and search for those items, all without reasonable 
suspicion, exceeded the scope of the legitimate traffic stop. The 
State has refuted none on the numerous cases relied upon by 
appellant, nor distinguished this case factually. This Court 
should reverse. 
D, THE STATE'S APPARENT CONTENTION THAT 
TROOPER RAPICH HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO 
ARREST PRIOR TO THE SEARCH IS NOT WELL 
TAKEN. 
Implicit in Mr. Alires' scope of detention claim is the 
fact that, at the time the search was performed, the officer did 
not have probable cause to arrest him. See opening brief at p. 8 
("Mr. Alires' statement that his license was suspended raised a 
reasonable suspicion of that violation as well, justifying further 
inquiry into that matter.11). In the trial court, appellant took 
exception to the State's proposed finding that the officer had 
probable cause to arrest prior to the search. R. 56.3 There are 
no waiver issues here. 
Mr. Alires will treat the State's brief as a merits 
contention that Trooper Rapich had probable cause to arrest prior 
to the search. This is not so. 
Mr. Alires was pulled over for a class C misdemeanor 
registration/equipment violation, not having a front license plate 
on the vehicle. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-404 (1993) (front 
3
"Mr. Alires takes exception to conclusion of law Number 6 
which states '[t]he search of the vehicle was substantially 
contemporaneous with defendant's arrest and probable cause existed 
for the arrest independent of the evidence found in the search.'" 
5 
license plate required) and Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1302 (1993) 
(unless otherwise specified, violations are class C misdemeanors). 
Although Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1995) purports to allow arrest 
for any offense committed in the presence of a peace officer, the 
fourth amendment and article I, section 14 require that every 
seizure be reasonable. This minor offense never justifies arrest. 
There are no public safety concerns. The offender's liberty 
interest far outweighs the State's interest in assuring an 
appearance at trial for this offense. Under the fourth amendment 
and article I, § 14 of the state constitution, arrest for this 
offense would be unreasonable. Cf. State v. Harmon, 910 P. 2d 1196, 
1203 (Utah 1995) (assessing fourth amendment reasonableness of 
arrest despite statutory authority to arrest, but deciding that 
unlicensed driver, presumedly unfit to drive, presented sufficient 
public safety risk to justify arrest). 
In addition to the front plate violation, Mr. Alires was 
unable to produce a vehicle registration and indicated that the 
license he produced was suspended. The vehicle registration 
problem only created a reasonable suspicion. The officer needed to 
confirm or dispel this suspicion with dispatch, by checking motor 
vehicle records, before probable cause could develop. Likewise, 
Mr. Alires' statement that the license he produced was suspended 
only created a reasonable suspicion. The fact that Mr. Alires was 
able to produce his license is strongly indicative of the fact that 
it was not suspended. When a license is suspended in Utah, it is 
confiscated by the Motor Vehicle Department. See Utah Code Ann. § 
6 
53-3-226 (1994) (confiscation generally) , Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-
223(4) (Supp. 1997) (in all DUI cases, licenses are immediately 
confiscated). The only accurate, reliable source for suspension 
information is the motor vehicle computer database, accessible to 
the officer through dispatch. The officer could only develop 
probable cause that the license was suspended by checking the motor 
vehicle records through dispatch. Trooper Rapich did not have 
probable cause to arrest at the time he searched the vehicle. No 
actual arrest occurred until after the search, when Mr. Alires was 
arrested for possession of methamphetamine. R. 219. Dispatch was 
not called concerning the registration, VIN, or Mr. Alires' 
licensure status until after the search. R. 214-5, 219, 224. 
Under these circumstances, the search is not supportable as a 
search incident to arrest. 
E. SUBJECTIVE INTENT IS RELEVANT TO THE 
EXTENT IT GOES TO WHETHER AND WHEN AN 
ARREST OCCURRED. 
The State argues that the officer's subjective intent 
concerning arrest is irrelevant in this case. Not so. To 
successfully invoke the search incident to arrest doctrine, the 
State must establish that an actual arrest occurred, that the 
arrest was premised on probable cause established independent of 
the challenged search, e.g. Sibron v. United States, 392 U.S. 40, 
63 (1968), and that the search was "substantially contemporaneous" 
with the arrest, e.g. Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818, 819 
7 
(1969). In determining whether and when an arrest occurred, both 
the officer's actions and intentions are relevant. 
CONCLUSION 
For the forgoing reasons, and as set forth in his opening 
brief, Mr. Alires respectfully requests that the trial court's 
denial of his motion to suppress evidence be reversed, and that the 
case be remanded with instructions that he be allowed to withdraw 
his conditional plea. ^ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this -^Q day of November, 1997. 
Aid-— 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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